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ABSTRACT                                       
 
The efficacy of the existing international financial regulation and adoption of an 
institutionalised form of regulation are among the global financial governance issues 
which have been well addressed by scholars in the field. The less investigated but directly 
related and worth considering issue is the impact of the contemporary global financial 
governance system on fundamental values like the rule of law. This article examines this 
less explored yet worth investigating issue with a focus on Basel III, namely, how far does 
the regulatory process under Basel III, as it stands today, inhibit or foster the rule of law. 
Soft law, informal groups of this regulatory network and the regulatory process are 
analyzed in the light of the relevant elements of the rule of law. The article shows that the 
accountability deficit and lack of inclusive governance in the Basel III regulatory system 
have inhibited the advancement of the rule of law which should have been fostered to build 
legitimacy in this regulatory system.     
Key words: accountability, Basel III, global financial governance,  participation, rule of 
law, soft law  
I. INTRODUCTION                                               
The growing interdependence of financial markets following the removal of restrictions 
on financial flows after World War II necessitated the establishment of a global 
communication and cooperation network.1 The need for the establishment of such a 
network to develop common standards and facilitate cooperation to solve global 
banking problems became an important global agenda after the bankruptcy of the 
Herstatt Bank in Germany in 1974.2 This incident illustrated a clear interdependence 
problem in global banking which required a global solution. In response to this and 
related problems in the financial market, the G103 established an informal forum for 
cooperation. The governors of the central banks of the G10 countries formed the 
Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices whose name was later 
changed to the Basel Committee. The objective of the Basel Committee is to ensure 
global financial stability through improved banking supervision. The Committee has 
reached a set of agreements which are usually referred to as Basel accords. Thus far, it 
has produced three accords: Basel I, II and III. The Committee’s standards are not legally 
 
1 Schmukler SL “Benefits and risks of financial globalization: challenges for developing countries” (World 
Bank Group 2004) available at  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/BenefitsandRisksofFinancialGlobalizationSchmukle
r.pdf    (accessed 09 April 2019). 
2 Schenk CR “Summer in the city: the 1974 international banking crisis in London and its implications for 
regulatory reform” (University of Glasgow 2011) available at   
http://www.erim.eur.nl/fileadmin/erim_content/documents/1974_Crisis_and_Response_15_Nov.pdf ( 
accessed 09 April 2019). 
3Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States        
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binding as it  is not established by a treaty or other form of legal instrument. The 
standards are also developed through an informal law making process. Thus, Basel 
accords can be considered as international soft law. However, Basel standards are being 
complied with worldwide as the banking regulatory network has partnered with formal 
international organizations which can provide implementation incentives.              
Basel I standards set minimum capital requirements and risk weighing 
guidelines. Basel I was, however, criticized for being less risk sensitive as it focused on 
credit risk and omitted operational risk. Its standards were also less clear. Basel II was 
introduced to fill the gaps in Basel I. Basel II developed Basel I standards in a more 
detailed manner. It also established  standards which require the holding of capital for 
operational risk. Serious questions were, however, raised about Basel II as it failed to 
ease the 2008 global financial crisis. Basel II was also criticized for allowing banking 
institutions to use their own risk assessment methods in determining the minimum 
capital they need to hold. The deficiencies of Basel II worsened the global financial 
crisis, and that led to Basel III. The Basel III accord incorporates tougher standards as it 
was developed in response to the global financial crisis.                        
Basel III standards are backed by politically and financially powerful groups 
which work toward their full enforcement. However, the informalities associated with 
this regulatory process could undermine the rule of law, a value that has become 
increasingly important in global governance and whose elements will be discussed in 
part two. This study concentrates on the consistency of this regulatory process with the 
rule of law. The rule of law is vital in building the legitimacy of public power exercised 
by regulatory bodies. The ideals of the rule of law in general and accountability and 
participation in particular promote multilateralism and prevent unilateral and 
plurilateral control over global governance. They do so by enabling the weak to 
collectively counterbalance the influence exerted by the powerful states. The rule of law, 
therefore, consists of fundamental ideals indispensable to limit the exercise of public 
power at a global level. Its absence would lead to uncertainties. That in turn hinders 
regulatory stability. As the Basel III regulatory process is inherently informal, its 
adherence to the ideals of the rule of law is disputable. The rules of the game in an 
informal global regulatory system would allow those who have the political and 
financial powers to shape governance in their favour as there are no established limits 
which could prevent this. This study shows that the regulatory process under Basel III is 
not consistent with the principles of accountability and participation and thus 
undermines the rule of law.   
While the debates on the cooperative/functional and institutional approaches to 
the global financial regulatory reform have been intense, the interplay between the 
Basel III regulatory process and the rule of law remains underexplored. The 
functionalists, including Stijn Claessens, Laura Kodres and Matthew Turk, focused on 
explaining  whether the existing global financial regulatory system is effective in 
stabilizing global banking. They rely on output legitimacy (efficiency) and not the rule of 
law to justify this regulatory system. The institutionalists, on the other hand, focused on 
authorization of the global financial regulatory bodies as a means to make the 
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regulatory system effective in stabilizing global banking. To be precise, both the 
functionalists and institutionalists focused on making the regulatory system more 
effective in stabilizing global banking and did not provide much insight about power 
controlling mechanisms in general and accountability and participation in particular. 
This article aims at narrowing this gap by appraising the Basel III regulatory process in 
the light of the principles of accountability and participation which are the core 
elements of the rule of law.    
 The main methods employed in this study are doctrinal analysis and legal 
theory. Accordingly, the regulatory process under Basel III is analyzed through the lens 
of the rule of law whose theoretical foundations are sketched in part four. However, 
appraising the regulatory process under Basel III in the light of the rule of law cannot be 
fruitful without involving at least findings from the disciplines of political science and 
finance. This study has thus used relevant inputs from these disciplines.  
This study, therefore, evaluates the Basel III regulatory process against the 
principles of accountability and participation which are identified, in part four, as the 
most relevant ideals of the rule of law for the purpose thereof . Given the complexity 
and multi-faceted nature of the rule of law and its elements, part two is entirely devoted 
to clarify and come to an operational understanding of this concept. This article has 
seven parts. The next part presents a literature review of the subject. Part three explains 
the methods and approaches employed by this study. Part four explores the competing 
conceptions of the rule of law and identifies the relevant ideals of the rule of law for the 
purpose of this study. Part five presents the regulatory process under Basel III. This 
regulatory process is appraised in the light of the relevant ideals of the rule of law in 
part six. Finally, part seven contains concluding remarks.  
2. THE CONCEPT OF THE RULE OF LAW   
2.1 The rule of law: what is it?    
The rule of law is a golden concept to which we make reference  oftentimes but it does 
not have a universally accepted definition. It is a notion that guides law and order. Yet, 
there is no clear understanding about its content. That is why scholars like Thomas 
describe it instead of suggesting a definition.4 Acknowledging the history of the rule of 
law in different legal systems and hence the diverse views thereof, Costa and Zolo 
refrained from proposing a precise taxonomy of the meanings of the rule of law stating 
that “such a task would require complementing our analysis with the bulk of current 
constitutional and administration sciences”.5 Similarly, scholars like Chesterman 
approached the rule of law not by suggesting a definition but by distinguishing it from 
 
4 Thomas J “Understanding rule of law / supremacy of law and underlying obstacles in Turkey and around 
the world” (Conference proceedings paper International Congress on Constitutional Law 2010) available 
at http://hukuk.meliksah.edu.tr/uploads/hukuk/kullanici_images/file/MUHFD-C_2-S_1_14.pdf (accessed 
28 April 2018). 
5 Costa P & & Zolo D The rule of law: history, theory and criticism (Springer 2007) at ix. 
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“rule of man” and “rule by law” which do not meaningfully control the power of the 
ruler.6 Chesterman asserted that “the content of the term ‘rule of law’ remains contested 
across both time and geography”.7 The rule of law does not have a defined list of 
elements. Thus, its content varies depending on the type of conception we adopt.  
The principles of the rule of law require, as the American Bar Association states 
it, “government of law and not men”.8 Of course, the rule of law cannot be separated 
from men/women, as law making, interpretation, enforcement, and respect therefor 
would not function in a vacuum. The rule of law is thus about the ideals which guide us 
in meeting the objectives we want to achieve.9 Despite the lack of a universally accepted 
definition of the rule of law, there are well developed conceptions of, and approaches to, 
the rule of law. An investigation into the content of the rule of law usually starts with 
the formal/procedural and substantive conceptions of the rule of law.10 The focus of the 
formal conception of the rule of law is on “instrumental limitations” on the exercise of 
power.11 Such conception of the rule of law does not judge the content of a law and is 
not, therefore, concerned with whether the law is bad or good. The formal conception of 
the rule of law is also referred to as procedural rule of law as it defines the rule of law 
through procedural ideals like accountability, participation, predictability, prospective 
application of law, openness, adjudication of disputes through an impartial body, clarity, 
and stability.             
On the other hand, the substantive theories of the rule of law go beyond the view 
held by the formalists. These theories approach the rule of law as based on justness of 
content and consider it as “the application of reason to reality in order to maintain a just 
and stable legal order”.12 According to these theories, the rule of law entails 
constitutionalism to limit power through reason.13 Thus, the substantive conceptions of 
the rule of law would require substantive justice. Some scholars claim that the rule of 
law consists of both substantive and procedural ideals. For Rachel Belton, for example, 
the rule of law consists of its substantive ideals  as ends and its procedural aspects as 
means.14 For scholars like Paul Craig, the rule of law is primarily concerned with 
procedure while it also involves substantive facets.15 The argument that the rule of law 
 
6 Chesterman S ‘An international rule of law?” (2008) 56 Am J Comp L 1. 
7 Chesterman (2008) at 12. 
8American Bar Association (ABA) What is the rule of law? (ABA Division for Publications 2007) at 4 
available at    
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/Part1DialogueROL.authc
heckdam.pdf ( accessed 14 July 2018). 
9 ABA (2007) at 4. 
10Chesterman (2008) at 12. 
11 Chesterma (2008) at 12. 
12 Sellers M “An introduction to the rule of law in comparative perspective” in Sellers M &  Tomaszewski T 
(eds) The rule of law in comparative perspective (Springer 2010) at 4. 
13 Sellers (2010) at 4. 
14 Belton R K Competing definitions of the rule of law: implications for practitioners (Carnegie Papers Rule 
of Law Series 2005) at 1-8. 
15 Craig P “Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law: an analytical framework (1997) PL at 
467-87. 
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consists of substantive ideals in addition to the procedural ones needs to be seriously 
questioned if the term “the rule of law” has to render a useful function.         
Considering the lack of clarity regarding the rule of law due to the competing 
conceptions, Paul Craig suggested that public lawyers and others interested in research 
involving the rule of law choose between these conceptions.16The substantive 
conception of the rule of law in particular is not yet clear enough, though some mention 
human rights as examples. The most striking problem with the substantive conception 
of the rule of law is that the determination of the badness/justness of a particular law 
would lead to the use of infinite substantive ideals thereby denying a functional use of 
the rule of law. Such conception of the rule of law would virtually extend its scope  to all 
the substantive ideals  which could be used to test the validity of laws. According to 
Joseph Raz, the rule of law should not be confused with other virtues like human rights, 
democracy, equality, and justice.17 A given legal system may, therefore, be judged not 
only based on the rule of law which is procedural but also other virtues. Joseph Raz has 
listed the ideals of the rule of law which can be summarized in simple terms as : 
accountability under the law; prospective application of law; predictability; stability; 
clarity; openness; and participation in regulatory process.18 According to him, a legal 
system has to comply with such procedural ideals to be in compliance with the rule of 
law.19 The substantive definition of the rule of law does not offer such an independent 
use of the rule of law and other values to evaluate a legal system. Such a definition 
virtually puts all the substantive values under the umbrella of the rule of law. That in 
turn gives a misleading meaning and scope to the rule of law.        
This article, therefore, upholds the procedural conception of the rule of law and 
thus considers it as a principle composed of procedural ideals. Such ideals will be used 
in evaluating the regulatory process under Basel III. Adoption of the procedural 
conception of the rule of law should not, however, be equated with rule by men. The 
former limits power while the latter allows uninhibited use of power. A procedural 
conception of the rule of law should not also be considered as ignorant about 
substantive justice as such conception does not preclude the use of other values 
mentioned above to evaluate a law.            
Many works have a combined list of both procedural ideals which constitute the 
rule of law in the sense that it is employed in this work and other substantive values 
which form part of the substantive conception of the rule of law. The latter cannot, 
therefore, be considered as the ideals of the rule of law based on the conception 
adopted in this article.  It is, therefore, indispensable to pick the procedural ideals and 
set aside the substantive values. What scholars have identified as substantive and 
procedural ideals of the rule of law have, for instance, been later embraced by the World 
Justice Project as universal principles constituting the rule of law. The World Justice 
 
16 Craig (1997) at 487. 
17 Raz J The authority of law: essays on law and morality 2nd ed (Oxford University Press 2012) at 212. 
18 Raz (2012) at 211. 
19 Raz (2012) at 211. 
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Project has listed principles which can generally be summarized as: government limited 
by the law; clear and just law; even application of law; participatory law making; 
protection of fundamental rights; and resolution of disputes by an independent organ.20 
These are ideals which are referred to as the principles of the rule of law by scholars 
like Rachel Belton.21 Such a list cannot, however, be maintained as some of its elements 
are incorporated based on the substantive conception of the rule of law, which is not 
tenable as discussed above. The definition developed by the UN Secretary-General in 
2004  also consisted of elements which mirror the principles mentioned above.22  
The relevant procedural ideals that could be derived from the discussion in this 
part can be summarized as: accountability under the law; prospective application of 
law; participation; independent determination of disputes; predictability; stability; and 
clarity in regulatory process. The remaining (human rights and just/good law) are 
substantive values concerned with the justness of the content of laws. As the 
substantive definition of the rule of law is not upheld in this study for reasons discussed 
before, these substantive values are not the elements of the rule of law. This study is, 
therefore, concerned with the procedural ideals (the elements of the rule of law) listed 
above as it aims at appraising the regulatory process under Basel III in the light of the 
rule of law.                                            
Given the limited time and space, it is difficult to appraise the regulatory process 
under Basel III in the light of all the elements of the rule of law. Choosing the most 
relevant ones for the purpose of this article is, therefore, indispensable, and the authors 
hope that future researchers will complement this study. With this in mind, 
accountability and participation are chosen as the most important elements of the rule 
of law for the purpose of this study. There is no treaty based multilateral body with a 
constitutionalized mandate on global banking regulation. As the Basel III regulatory 
system lacks a constitution which defines its functions and structure, its consistency 
with the principle of accountability is disputable. In the absence of formally defined 
functions and structure, it is quite difficult to understand who is accountable to whom, 
let alone fully enforce accountability mechanisms. A related issue is that the global 
financial regulation under Basel III is dominated by informalities. Informal regulation is 
prone to influence by those with stronger economic and political power. This would 
make it imperative to evaluate the regulatory process under Basel III in the light of the 
notion of participatory regulatory process which is one of the elements of the rule of 
law.                       
The elements of the rule of law employed in this study are, therefore, 
accountability and participation. This does not mean that other elements of the rule of 
law are irrelevant or of little importance. The selection of the two elements should be 
understood  in the light of the limited scope of this study and their relatively greater 
importance in the regulatory process under Basel III.          
 
20 Belton (2005) at 1-8. 
21 Belton (2005) at 3-6. See also  http://democracyweb.org/node/63 (accessed 28 April 2018). 
22 UN, Report of the United Nations Secretary-General report on the rule of law and transitional justice in 
conflict and post-conflict societies S/2004/616 (2004) at para. 6. 
  
GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
Page | 155  
 
2.2 Accountability   
The concept of accountability is obscure. While it has become an important tool to build 
the legitimacy of an agent both at national and global levels, lack of a clear definition has 
made its practical use difficult. Understanding its international dimension is even more 
difficult as the actors and the ways of interaction among the actors are more complex 
and dynamic compared to their counterparts at national levels. The global financial 
regulatory system under Basel III is a good example of a complex web of actors where 
determining the role of the principle of accountability is quite difficult. The Basel 
Committee, the G20, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), 
national governments, and some influential regional entities are involved in the 
administration of Basel III and constitute a complex web of governance. While global 
governance is getting more complex, the principle of accountability has not shown a 
parallel advance. The obscurity of the concept has made it difficult to provide a 
comprehensible definition which can be applied in multi-faceted regulatory set-ups.23 
Cognizant of the incomprehensibility of the notion of accountability, Robert 
Wolfe insisted that the concept of accountability is explained based on the purposes it 
serves rather than its technical merits.24 Accountability may also be considered as 
either a political or legal notion depending on the particular mechanisms employed to 
make an agent accountable.25 The concept of accountability cannot, thus, be easily 
formed in the abstract. However, it is generally acknowledged that this concept requires 
an agent to justify his/her/its actions and also to be subjected to scrutiny, which could 
result in the imposition of a sanction, by the principal or other entities on behalf of the 
principal.26 
Robert Keohane has also explained the concept of accountability : 
“An accountability relationship is one in which an individual, group or other entity 
makes demands on an agent to report on his or her activities, and has the ability to 
impose costs on the agent.”27 
He has identified two types of accountability based on the nature of the accountability 
relationship: institutionalized/authorized accountability and informal arrangements of 
accountability.28 In institutionalized accountability, the principal entities have the right 
to hold their agent accountable and there is a corresponding obligation imposed on the 
 
23 Drake A Civil society and WTO accountability IISD-ENTWINED (Geneva 9 May 2009) at 2. 
24 Wolfe R Who is accountable at the World Trade Organization? Conference paper International Studies 
Association ( Montreal 19 March 2011) at 8. 
25 The World Bank *Accountability in governance (Governance and Public Sector Management, WB 2006) 
at 1-5 available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/publicsectorandgovernance/Resources/AccountabilityGovernance.p
df (accessed 15 May 2018). 
26 Drake (2009) at  2-4. 
27Keohane R Global governance and democratic accountability (Duke University 2002) at 12. See also  
Grant R “Accountability and abuses of power in world politics”  (2005) 99 American Political Science 
Review at  29-43. 
28 Keohane (2002) at 12 ; Grant (2005) at 29-43. 
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agent. In other forms of accountability, the principals aspire to hold their agent 
accountable claiming a right to do so while the agent does not recognize such a right. 
Such forms of accountability are loose and do not constitute accountability proper. The 
rule of law is a tool to limit power. Accountability, being an element of the rule of law, 
imposes obligations on an agent to limit its power. This gives a corresponding right to 
the principals to hold their agent accountable. In this article, accountability should, 
therefore, be understood to mean institutionalized accountability.     
The debates about the mechanisms of institutionalized accountability revolve 
primarily around accountability through constitutionalism and representation.29 First, 
institutions are governed by, and accountable to, their constitutions. Constitutions do 
not simply establish institutions. They define the boundaries within which the 
institutions function by setting the institutional structure, objectives and core 
functions.30 Global regulatory bodies are bound by such constitutional limits. The 
second mechanism of accountability – accountability through representation – is highly 
contested when it comes to its application at the international level, though it is not 
completely irrelevant.                                        
Woods and Narlikar asserted that accountability through representation is 
proved to be inadequate even at domestic levels since voters normally use polls not for 
the purpose of holding their representatives accountable, but rather to express their 
loyalty or keenness to a set of future policies designed by parties.31 Applying this mode 
of accountability to hold informal forums like the Basel Committee accountable is even 
more questionable as no public power is formally delegated to them.     
There are also accountability mechanisms which are usually termed “horizontal 
accountability”.32 Woods and Narlikar have identified “transparency, evaluation, 
compliance monitoring, and enforcement of the limits, rules and norms as to the 
exercise of official power” as the existing mechanisms of horizontal accountability.33 
The last one – enforcement of the established limits on the exercise of power – could 
also be considered as the enforcement of constitutional accountability as regulatory 
bodies are constitutionally bound by such limits. The remaining three mechanisms of 
horizontal accountability could be recapitulated as transparency and review because 
evaluation and compliance monitoring appear as review when they are employed as 
accountability mechanisms. It should be noted that constitutional and horizontal 
accountability mechanisms are closely related to each other. Accountability to 
constitutional principles does not function in a vacuum. Its enforcement needs 
horizontal accountability mechanisms particularly in global governance where 
democratic accountability can hardly be used to enforce it. In the light of the discussion 
in this part, this study uses constitutional and horizontal accountability mechanisms.                                                                                    
 
29 Woods N & Narlikar A “Governance and the limits of accountability (2001) 53 International Social 
Science Journal at 569-583. 
30 Woods & Narlikar (2001) at 569-583. 
31 Woods & Narlikar (2001) at 574. 
32 Woods & Narlikar (2001) at 574. 
33 Woods & Narlikar (2001) at 574. 
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2.3 Participation   
Participation in the formation and implementation of the rules and adjudication process 
in a given governance system is one of the core elements of the rule of law. 
Accountability and other elements of the rule of law cannot be enforced effectively in 
the absence of participation. The definition of the rule of law given by the UN Secretary-
General seems to be cognizant of this fact when it clearly stated that “participation in 
decision making is one of the elements of the rule of law”. Other definitions of the rule of 
law, as discussed above, have also referred to this element of the rule of law by using 
general terms like open or participatory regulatory process. Decision making in the 
regulatory process under Basel III takes place at the stages of formulation and 
implementation of the rules and review process. Thus, “participation in decision 
making” comes into play at all these stages.                           
The meaning of participation differs based on the type of participants, the entity 
in which they participate, and the objective of a particular form of participation. Broadly 
speaking, there are three categories of participation, namely, “public, social and 
individual participation”.34 Public participation comes into the picture when a 
governance system engages the public in its regulatory process, while social and 
individual participation appear in “collective activities” and “individual choices as parts 
of daily life”, respectively.35 The focus of this article is on public participation because 
participation as an element of the rule of law aims at limiting the exercise of public 
power through participatory governance. Participation has become one of the 
important tools to build legitimacy in global governance. Its role in the Basel III 
regulatory process is thus examined in this article, bearing in mind its growing 
importance at the global level .                       
An important question here will be : who has the right to participate in decision 
making in the regulatory process under Basel III. States are the first bearers of the right 
to participate in this regulatory process based on “the all-affected principle” of 
democratic governance that requires “the participation of all addressees in the decision-
making process”.36 However, the conception that considers international governance 
only as an intergovernmental process is obsolete and does not correspond with 
contemporary governance which increasingly recognizes other participants. In terms of 
international law making, for example, other participants are playing a crucial role 
producing norms with global effect. Arnold Pronto explained this stating that 
“international law is made in a large number of fora, including a variety of multilateral 
processes, tribunals and the organs of international organizations”.37 Moreover, though  
 
34Pathways through Participation  What is participation? Towards a round earth view of participation 
Briefing paper no1 (2009) at 1 available at http://pathwaysthroughparticipation.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2009/09/Briefing-paper-1-What-is-participation.pdf  (accessed on   15 May 2018). 
35 Pathways through participation (2009). 
36Alexander K, Lorez K,  Zobl M &  Thürer D  The legitimacy of the G20 – a critique under international law 
(University of Zurich 2014) at 10. 
37 Pronto A “Some thoughts on the making of international law” (2008) 19 The European Journal of 
International Law at 601-616. 
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States continue to be the principal producers of international law, other participants, 
including international organizations, NGOs and expert individuals, join them and 
influence the process.38 
Furthermore, actors with a legitimate interest come into play at the stages of 
implementation and adjudication of international law. As implementation and 
adjudication of international law have an intrusive effect, a multitude of actors whose 
interests are substantially affected by global decisions are being recognized as 
legitimate participants. International law is expanding the scope of its constituencies by 
progressively accommodating substantially affected entities. The World Bank 
Inspection Panel, which has been established to reach communities affected by projects 
funded by the Bank, is a good example of this. On the other hand, the participatory right 
of NGOs and expert individuals is not yet well defined under international law. There is 
a reluctance to give this right a legal status, while the informal involvement of NGOs and 
individual experts in global regulatory processes is ever expanding.                                                  
In the light of the discussion above, evaluating not only the participation of States 
but also other actors in the regulatory process under Basel III would be indispensable. 
Accordingly, the scope of the article is extended to include appraising the involvement 
of financial institutions in the regulatory process.    
3. GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATORY PROCESS UNDER BASEL III 
3.1 Transition to Basel III 
The micro-prudential approaches to global financial regulation and the softer standards 
under Basel I and II were proved inadequate to respond to systemic financial crisis. 
Thus, a more responsive framework which integrates both micro- and macro-prudential 
approaches and sets higher standards became compulsively necessary following the 
global financial crisis. As a result, Basel III came into the picture with the aim to 
strengthen the financial system at both  individual institution and systemic levels 
through an integrated approach and stricter standards.39 
It is, therefore, in response to the financial crisis felt globally in 2008 that the 
Basel Committee introduced its third Basel accord (Basel III) in 2010.40 The Basel III 
framework is a comprehensive accord consisting of reform measures tailored to 
strengthening the financial system through tougher regulation, strict supervision, and 
well defined risk management of the globalized banking sector.41 As a publication by 
PwC’s Financial Services Institute stated , Basel III’s objective is “a future of more 
capital, more liquidity, and lower risk”.42 To achieve this objective, Basel III has set 
 
38 Pronto (2008) at 601-616. 
39 Kumar S, Rohit V & Kumar J Basel III: the way forward. White Paper ( Infosys 2012) at 1-2. 
40 Kumar et al (2012) at 1. 
41 Financial Services Institute (of PwC) The new Basel III framework: navigating changes in bank capital 
management (Financial Services Institute 2010) at 3. 
42 Financial Services Institute (2010) at 3 . 
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higher standards regarding capital requirements, risk-weighted assets, minimum 
capital ratio requirements, and capital buffers.43 The revised “liquidity coverage ratio” 
(LCR)44 and the “net stable funding ratio” (NSFR)45 which were issued in 2013 and 
2014, respectively, are also important components of Basel III. The LCR requires banks 
to have sufficient stock of high-quality and unassailable liquid assets which can 
immediately be converted, in private markets, into cash to respond to liquidity needs in 
the short run, ie “for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario”.46 The NSFR, on the 
other hand requires banks to have “a stable funding profile in relation to the 
composition of their assets and off-balance sheet activities”.47 
The tougher standards on capital requirement under Basel III would increase the 
barriers to join the banking sector, and that in turn benefits already existing ones. The 
tougher the capital requirements the smaller the number of  newcomers and thus the 
less the competition will be.48 On the other hand, the bigger financial institutions – 
“systematically important banks” – will incur an extensive loss as they will face a 
relatively higher capital requirement, and that in turn would inhibit the growth of such 
banks.49 Basel III’s tieing up effect on scarce capital necessary for growth in developing 
countries and the harmonization process are also controversial.50 The harmonization 
process under Basel III could even drag down better standards in countries like India.51 
Due to recurring controversies and ever changing circumstances in the volatile 
global financial system, the Basel Committee has continued with its customary task of 
refining Basel III guidelines and scheduling and rescheduling their implementation. The 
revisions made in 2013 (LCR), 2014 (NSFR) and 2016 (“Revisions to the Basel III 
Leverage Ratio Framework 52)   are notable examples of the continuous modification 
process.  Though the implementation of Basel III was scheduled from 2013-2015 and  
started in 2013, many of its components went through continuous review processes, 
and such changes extended implementation until 2018 and then again to 2019.53 
 
 
43 Financial Services Institute (2010) at 3. See also Kumar et al (2012) at 2. 
44 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.htm ( accessed 13 May 2018). 
45 http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.htm ( accessed 13 May 2018). 
46 The Basel Committee  Basel III: The liquidity coverage ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools, (Bank for 
International Settlements 2013) at para 14. 
47 The Basel Committee  Basel III: the net stable funding ratio (Bank for International Settlements 2014) at 
para 1. 
48http://marketrealist.com/2014/09/shortcomings-basel-3-accord/ (accessed 13 May 2018). 
49 http://marketrealist.com/2014/09/shortcomings-basel-3-accord/ (accessed 13 May 2018) 
50http://marketrealist.com/2014/09/shortcomings-basel-3-accord/ (accessed 13 May 2018) . See also 
The Basel Committee Assessment of Basel III risk-based capital regulations – India (Bank for International 
Settlements 2015) at 5. 
 51 http://marketrealist.com/2014/09/shortcomings-basel-3-accord/ (accessed 13 May 2018) ; The Basel 
Committee (2015) at 5. 
52 The Basel Committee Revisions to the Basel III leverage ratio framework (Bank for International 
Settlements 2016). 
53 http://www.isda-iq.org/2015/10/16/the-basel-iii-timeline/ (accessed 19 May 2018). 
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3.2 Basel III regulatory process 
 
In any regulatory process, what comes first is the formulation of norms. A discussion on 
the regulatory process under the Basel III accord has, therefore, to start with the 
manner in which the accord was formulated. The Basel III framework has been 
developed through an informal international law making process. Before an agreement 
is reached by the Committee on new rules, extensive preparatory works are handled by 
assigned subgroups, and such subgroups provide draft proposals.54As Jonas Niemeyer 
put it, “much of the practical decision-making takes place in the committee’s 
subgroups”.55 Once concrete proposals are ready, they are released for public 
consultation so that interested groups can comment on them.56 Most of the Basel III 
proposals were released for public consultation.57 After the preparatory work was done 
following the 2008 financial crisis, the Basel Committee issued a document on global 
banking regulation – Basel III – in December 2010 subsequent to the endorsement of 
such  document by the G20 in November 2010 in Seoul.58 The Committee then issued a 
revised version of Basel III in 2011.59 The Basel III standards were, therefore, developed 
by an informal forum through a process which does not require the traditional 
procedures of international law making. 
Thus, one of the main features of the global banking regulatory system is the lack 
of governance based on formally established common obligations. As global financial 
regulation is an area where the tension between the need for international governance, 
on the one hand, and domestic policy choice, on the other, is very high, informality has 
become the hallmark of international financial regulation. Voluntarism and limited 
capacity in policy management are inherent to the Basel Committee and  are the main 
reasons which have made the process of formulation of the Basel III framework 
informal.60 
Though its status is not yet defined under public international law, the informal 
law making process is on the rise. As Ramses Wessel put it, “international organizations 
and informal international regimes are engaged in normative processes that, de jure or 
de facto, impact on states and even on individuals and businesses”.61 Joost Pauwelyn has 
also claimed that “to define a legal order as limited to legally binding norms only is too 
 
54 Niemeyer J “Basel III – what and why?” SverigesRiksbank Economic Review 1 (2016) at 61-93. 
55 Niemeyer (2016) at 63. 
56 Niemeyer (2016) at 63. 
57 M. Peihani M Basel Committee on banking supervision: a post-crisis analysis of governance and legitimacy 
(unpublished PhD thesis, the University of British Columbia, 2014) at ii. 
58 http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm ( accessed 06 July 2018).    
59 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm  ( accessed 06 July 2018).    
60 Donnelly S “Informal international lawmaking: global financial market regulation” in Berman A, Duquet 
S, Pauwelyn J, Wessel R  Wouters J (eds) Informal international lawmaking: case studies, (Torkel Opsahl 
Academic EPublisher 2012) at 193. 
61 Wessel R “Informal international law-making as a new form of  world legislation?” (2011) 8 
International Organizations Law Review at 253–265. 
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narrow” while leaving the legal status of informal international law making for further 
scrutiny.62 The informal international law making process manifests itself in terms of 
“output, process or the actors involved”.63 It produces standards/guidelines as opposed 
to traditional sources of international law like treaties. Informal networks and not 
international organizations are coordinators of the process. The actors involved in such 
networks are also not diplomats. The process of informal international law making is 
also usually exclusionary as its architects are the groups with greater political and 
financial power. Informality is inherent in the international banking regulatory system. 
This regulatory system, therefore, shares the features of informal international law 
making. 
                                
Though the Basel Committee has expanded its membership following the 
financial crisis, most of the developing countries are still outsiders. In response to the 
financial crisis, the G20 Members held a series of summits to set the directions towards 
improved post-crisis global financial governance.64 An institutional facility which can 
coordinate the reform process was deemed so indispensable that the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) was created for this purpose.65As Jeffery Atik has stated , “the FSB directed 
much of the design and spirit of Basel III, although the formal proposals resulted from 
the Basel Committee”.66  The Basel Committee is not a formal international organization 
and has no capacity to propose legally binding rules. The central bank governors of the 
members of the Basel Committee, and not , are the main actors in the process. Such a 
“soft-law standard-setting method” is considered as “an alternative form of 
international law making without cumbersome treaty making rules”.67 
The second stage where informalities are seen in the regulatory process under 
Basel III is implementation. To begin with, as Basel III is a set of voluntary standards, its 
enforcement depends primarily on national governments. As Daniel McDowell has 
stated , “the lack of an enforcement mechanism threatens the nascent agreement's 
prospects”.68 Such lack of an enforcement mechanism which is a reflection of the soft 
law nature of global financial governance led to the emergence of the G20 “as an 
executive coordinator”.69 The G20 has taken the leading role in global financial 
 
62 Pauwelyn J Informal international lawmaking: mapping the action and testing concepts of accountability 
and effectiveness. Working paper Center for Trade and Economic Integration (Geneva 2011) at 3-9. 
63 Pauwelyn (2011) at 3-9. 
64 Atik J “EU implementation of Basel III in the shadow of  the euro crisis” (2014) 33 Review of Banking & 
Financial Law   at 283-341. 
65 Atik (2014) at 309. 
66 Atik (2014) at 309. 
67 Segura-Serrano A “International economic law at a crossroads: global governance and normative 
coherence” (2014) 27 Leiden Journal of International Law at 677 – 700. 
68 McDowell D “Basel III represents test for US, G-20 World Politics Review (28 September 2010) available 
at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6527/basel-iii-represents-test-for-u-s-g-20 (accessed 
23 May 2018). 
69 Lee E Basel III and its new capital requirements, as distinguished from Basel II. University of Hong Kong 
Faculty of Law research paper no 2014/046 (2014) at 5. 
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governance in general and banking regulation in particular after the global financial 
crisis. This forum has become the de facto global administrative body responsible “ to 
set standards and monitor enforcement, compliance and aid recovery”.70 
That there is no formally established international body to enforce Basel III 
standards would mean that States, particularly G20 Members, have to police the 
conduct of each other to ensure compliance with these standards. It should, however, be 
noted that the Basel Committee and the G20 have partnered with influential formal 
international organizations, including the IMF and the WB, to ensure effective 
implementation of Basel III.                                         
The third stage in an ordinary regulatory process is review. This aspect of a 
regulatory process has become an important accountability instrument in global 
administration as accountability through representation cannot cope with such 
administration which has become more dynamic. Unlike international organizations 
like the WTO, the global networks coordinating the regulation of the financial market, 
including the G20, FSB and Basel Committee, can hardly establish a dispute settlement 
mechanism as the global financial market problems are systemic. Thus, judicial review 
could not be presented as an accountability mechanism in global banking regulation. Yet 
there are other review mechanisms, including evaluation and compliance monitoring, 
which can be used to ensure accountability. The global banking regulatory system 
managed by the G20 and Basel Committee in partnership with international 
organizations including the IMF and WB manifests features of global administration. 
Therefore, this regulatory system should be held accountable through review 
mechanisms.                                
The Basel Committee has established a reporting process aimed at periodically 
reviewing Basel III’s implications for banks and it has been publishing the results of its 
monitoring exercise since 2012.71 It  released its latest Monitoring Report in March 
2016. This reporting system is  a technical assessment process rather than a proper 
review . As the latest Monitoring Report itself stated, the Committee prepares its reports 
based on data “obtained by voluntary and confidential submissions from individual 
banks and their national supervisors”.72 The IMF and WB also have  a joint assessment 
program which evaluates compliance with Basel standards as part of the wider financial 
sector assessment process. It should, however, be noted that these review processes 
aim to ensure  compliance by financial institutions and supervisory authorities with 
Basel standards. They do not aim to hold the global banking regulators like the Basel 
Committee accountable. There are no formal evaluation and compliance monitoring   




70 Lee (2014) at 5. 
71 http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d354.htm ( accessed 25 May 2018). 
72 The Basel Committee*Basel III monitoring report (Bank for International Settlements March 2016) at 1. 
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3.3 Basel III as a global financial regulatory framework 
Basel III instruments are produced by the Basel Committee which  is a forum that has no 
formal capacity to adopt rules with  binding force. The standards and guidelines 
adopted by the Basel Committee are, however, being complied with by its members and 
many non-member countries across the world. This soft law financial regulatory 
framework is seen “as more coercive than traditional theories of international law 
predict”.73 The standards developed by this regulatory system are more than what we 
traditionally perceive as soft law. These standards “reflect mutual commitments made 
after intense negotiations, and taken together, they contain both incentives for 
compliance and at least the suggestion of meaningful sanctions for non-compliance”.74  
The Basel Committee has gradually emerged as an international banking 
regulatory body as its collaboration with other international organizations has enabled 
it to implement its standards worldwide. As René Urueña has stated, “the Basel 
Committee has engaged in de facto global financial regulation, a move that should have 
reasonably triggered the need for legitimacy and opened spaces for subjectivation”.75 
The global banking regulatory system has an influential network which can ensure 
implementation of Basel III even in a more effective way than traditional public 
international law is enforced. This informal network has brought strategically 
important international organizations including the IMF and WB on board. As Peter 
Hajnal put it, the IMF and WB are “in the inner circle of observers at both the G20 
summit and finance ministers’ levels” and they are regular participants of the meetings 
held by the G20 central bank governors.76 The two institutions are also members of the 
FSB which was created by the G20 to monitor the global financial system.77 
As discussed above, the financial sector related IMF and WB conditionalities have 
facilitated worldwide implementation of Basel III standards. Emerging market banks 
are becoming increasingly important to the financial markets and investors of 
developed markets. Worldwide application of Basel III standards is, therefore, seen as 
indispensable to ensure a healthy global financial market. Basel III standards have been 
designed primarily with the US and EU financial markets in mind and are found to be 
inappropriate for emerging markets.78 However, the ever increasing global financial 
market interdependence has become a driving force towards worldwide regulation of 
the banking sector through these standards.79As Mayra Valladares explained , in the 
existing global financial stability assessment regime, “a key metric of a bank’s financial 
health is how well it is coping with adherence to financial regulations, such as Basel 
 
73 Segura-Serrano (2014) at 689-691. 
74 Segura-Serrano (2014) at 690. 
75Urueña, No citizens here: global subjects and participation in international law (MartinusNijhoff 
Publishers 2012) at 264. 
76 Hajnal, The G20: Evolution, Interrelationships, Documentation, (Routledge 2014) At 55-66. 
77 http://www.fsb.org/about/fsb-members/ (accessed 26 May 2018). 
78 Willis B “Basel III bank rules will damage developing countries” ( Newsmax 15 June 2012). 
http://www.newsmax.com/InvestingAnalysis/Basel-Bank-Rules-developing/2012/06/15/id/442468/ 
79 Valladares MBasel III: can it be implemented in emerging markets? (MRV Associates 2012) at 1. 
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III”.80 One of the core subjects in the joint IMF and WB Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) is compliance with Basel standards. That is why this assessment 
program went through significant changes following the global financial crisis81 which 
has resulted in Basel III.     
What can be understood from the Basel III implementation process and a 
complete set of regulators involved in the global banking regulatory system is that such 
a system has emerged as a global administrative system. It is in recognition of this fact 
that René Urueña came to the conclusion that “while the initial regulatory practices of 
the Basel Committee simply outsourced subjectivation to domestic regulatory agencies, 
recent practices show developments towards subjectivation”.82If this system can be 
considered as a global administrative system, an important question that will follow is 
whether it adheres to procedural norms, such as,  accountability and participation, 
which are necessary for the exercise of public power by global bodies to be legitimate. 
The following part aims to address this question.      
4. THE REGULATORY PROCESS UNDER BASEL III AND THE RULE OF LAW 
4.1 Financial explanations underpinning the existing banking regulatory 
system and the quest for institutionalisation        
The financial explanations that justify the existing regulatory system under Basel III are 
closely linked to the financial causes of the 2008 global financial crisis. Though a 
complex set of factors which cannot be exhausted here was identified as the cause of the 
crisis, failures in the financial sector itself were identified as the major causes of the 
crisis. As a report produced by a task force commissioned by the International 
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions made  clear, “failures in the financial system, 
particularly in the US, were at the root of the problem” and the crisis which started in 
the US “spread through financial and real economic channels to the rest of the world”.83 
The subprime mortgage lending practices of Freddie Mac and Fanny Mae led to the 
crisis as there was uncalled for confidence in these private companies due to their 
peculiar status which is attributable to their being government sponsored initiatives 
established by federal law.84 The first round of actions by the Federal Reserve including 
 
80 Valladeres (2012) at 1. 
81 https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fsap.htm ( accessed 26 May 2018). 
82 Urueña (2012) at 265. 
83 Norgren C The causes of the global financial crisis and their Implications for supreme audit institutions 
(International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions 2010) at 17. 
84 Hamilton J “Did Fannie and Freddie cause the mortgage crisis?” Available at 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/85146-did-fannie-and-freddie-cause-the-mortgage-crisis (accessed 06 
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liquidity and money market funds were  found not to be sufficient, and that led to 
adoption of new laws and measures under the Bush administration.85             
The huge sum of money banks released to the real estate market “pushed up the 
prices of houses along with the level of personal debt as interest had to be paid on all 
the loans that banks made”.86 This eventually made the debts unpayable and led to the 
crisis as banks faced the danger of going bankrupt and started limiting their lending.87 
The then risk assessment methods used by the banks and banking supervision 
mechanisms are also identified as factors responsible for the crisis.88 In terms of 
regulation, lack of focus on macro-prudential financial regulation has been found to be 
the cause the crisis.89 The traditional regulatory approach – the micro-prudential 
approach – which aimed to improve the welfare of individual financial institutions did 
not prevent the crisis at a systemic level.            
Basel III is designed with the causes of the crisis in mind. The informalities that 
are inherent in the existing banking regulatory system are, therefore, justified based on 
the complex nature of global financial problems. Addressing these problems has become 
very challenging and led to intense controversy over the regulatory approach that the 
international banking regulatory system should adopt. Those who want to maintain the 
status quo, like Matthew Turk, claim that the “interdependence problems of finance” are 
so complex and different in their nature from problems related to, for example, global 
trade.90 The main argument is that “monitoring breaches of international financial 
agreements is extremely complicated as global finance is affected by spillovers between 
states that are systemic and diffuse, rather than bilateral”.91 To be precise, this claim 
rejects institutionalisation of the global financial regulatory system and prefers informal 
governance to ensure close cooperation.                    
Other scholars suggest that institutionalisation is essential to make the global 
financial regulatory system stable.92 This is missing as the regulatory system is 
inherently informal. The existing regulatory system lacks legitimacy to defend an 
interventionist regulatory approach required to handle crisis.93 Legitimacy might be 
claimed based on output (efficiency) in the global financial regulatory system. However, 
 
85 Reyes A “The financial crisis five years later: response, reform, and progress in charts” available at 
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such form of legitimacy requires “generally accepted principles” established through 
participatory norm development94 which is missing in the global financial regulatory 
system as explained in the previous part. A global regulatory system cannot, therefore, 
be legitimate simply because it is efficient. In simple terms, a global regulatory system 
can hardly be defended without at least an acceptable degree of legitimacy. The global 
financial regulatory network has, therefore, evolved into a global administrative system, 
as discussed in part 5, while it lacks legitimacy.        
As long as the financial regulatory system has demonstrated features of global 
administration, failure to build legitimacy in such a system would deny non-
participating States protection from financial imperialism. It is true that the global 
problems of finance are more complex than, for example, trade related issues. However, 
considering these problems as completely unreachable through a constitutionalized 
regulatory system is unwarranted. In any event, the financial regulatory system has to 
adhere to global administrative norms as it has evolved as a global administrative 
system.   
One of the main arguments in favor of informal international law making is that 
it serves as “a device for minimizing impediments to cooperation”.95 The central 
explanation here is that improving the global banking regulatory system’s effectiveness 
in stabilizing global banking would require a corresponding reduction in accountability 
and participation. Needless to say, improved cooperation is an important tool to ensure 
effectiveness in governance. This does not, however, answer the following question: is a 
regulatory process which is accountable and participatory ineffective by definition? 
Accountability and participation are necessary to build legitimacy in a global 
administrative system. A global administrative system which is not accountable and 
participatory would face a big challenge while mobilizing the leading participants’ 
human and capital resources towards realization of its objectives. Smooth 
implementation of global policies is, of course, one of the reasons behind the growing 
move towards improving the legitimacy of global regulators through an accountable 
and participatory regulatory process. As David Harland stated, “international 
administration, at its most effective, would combine the legitimacy of broad 
international and national support with the capacities of lead-nation resources”.96 
4.2 Accountability in the regulatory process 
To begin with, it is quite difficult to demonstrate that the existing global banking 
regulatory system complies with the core ideals of the rule of law. This regulatory 
system is led by informally established ad hoc  groups which comprise governments 
and financial institutions as their members. This regulatory system is not founded or 
based on a treaty, charter or other form of legal instrument. The rule of law requires 
 
94 Alexnder et al (2014) at 7-10.     
95Lipson C “Why are some international agreements informal?” (1991) 45 International Organization  at 
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accountability in its institutionalized form. The banking regulatory system under Basel 
III does not demonstrate structural and operational qualities which can ensure 
institutionalized accountability. The system has not yet developed a formal constitution 
which defines its boundaries, structure, functions, objectives and procedures. As 
explained in part 4, constitutional accountability requires formally established 
boundaries to which a regulatory system is held accountable.   
Though the Basel Committee has a Charter with constitutional characteristics, it 
cannot be used as an effective constitutional accountability mechanism given the fact 
that it does not impose legal obligations and is meant to control an informal group. 
Needless to say, the Charter contributes to the advancement of accountability in the 
Basel III regulatory system. Among others, it has defined the responsibilities of the 
Committee and some of its key officials. The Charter has also determined procedures for 
the appointment of the Chairman, Secretariat and Secretary General. Though there is a 
serious lack of clarity, as will be explained, the Charter has also devised the Committee’s 
structure and decision making procedures. However, what if this informal group – the 
Basel Committee – sets aside a principle incorporated under the Charter while 
discharging its functions and thus fails to be accountable to its “constitution”? It is while 
attempting to answer this question that one  realizes that the Basel III regulatory 
system has not yet embraced constitutional accountability proper. As discussed in part 
4, enforcement of constitutional accountability relies on horizontal accountability 
mechanisms – transparency and review – which are largely ignored by the Basel III 
regulatory system , as discussed below in this part.              
Transparency is an important component of good governance in general and 
accountability in particular. We cannot, therefore, think of accountability in its 
appropriate sense in the absence of transparency. Transparency “requires openness in 
decision-making and ultimately constitutes a prerequisite for every type of observation, 
control and influence by outsiders”.97 The executive body of  Basel III regulatory system 
– the  G20 – does not adhere to this requirement. As an informal group, it employs 
procedures which stand against the principle of transparency. The G20 undermines 
transparency as “the summit meetings are held behind closed doors, protocols are not 
published and preparatory consultations with non-members scarcely exist”.98 There is 
no also clear criteria for becoming a member of this group.99 
There is also a transparency deficit in the Basel Committee despite some positive 
developments. The Basel Committee has shown some laudable progress while 
developing the Basel III standards, for example, by opening up its proposals for public 
comment. The “public consultation process” set up under section 17 of the Committee’s 
Charter which was adopted by the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision 
(GHOS) in 2013 requires the Committee to open up its policy proposals for public 
consultation. As indicated above, the Committee is also required to disclose decisions of 
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public interest. It is not, however, clear which decisions are decisions of public interest. 
It could be argued that such decisions are those related to “standards, guidelines and 
sound practices” as developing such policy instruments is the core responsibility of the 
Committee as stated under section 8 of the Charter. In any case, as Maziar Peihani 
stated, “what ‘public interest’ is and when a decision takes on such a characteristic are 
questions that fall within the unbounded discretion of the Committee”.100 
The Charter also lacks clarity on the composition of the GHOS. It is not clear, for 
example, whether one jurisdiction can have more than one representative at GHOS 
meetings. It is also not clear if observers can be represented at such meetings. There is 
also no consistency on publishing information on the groups of the Committee. While 
the Committee has published the members of the Basel Consultative Group on its 
website,101 similar information is not published regarding the remaining groups. The 
Committee’s decision making procedures also remain non-transparent. Decisions are 
made at the rule formulation and implementation stages. The process of formulation 
and implementation of Basel III standards is inherently informal and such informality 
makes it very difficult to realize transparency as an accountability mechanism. Much of 
the Committee’s work is done by invisible groups whose decision making procedures 
are not disclosed to the public. There are also no rules which require, for example, 
disclosure in advance of the agendas and meeting dates of the Committee . The Charter 
has also not set deliberation procedures. Moreover, the Charter does not say anything 
about the participation of non-member and non-observer constituencies in its decision 
making process. The Committee’s practice has also demonstrated a transparency deficit. 
It holds meetings behind closed doors, already held meetings are not regularly 
disclosed, and details of its deliberations are mostly confidential unless a press 
statement is made following agreement on a particular policy.102 
What is clear about decision making under the Charter is that the Committee 
makes decisions by consensus. This would mean that all members should agree or there 
should, at least, be no disagreement. However, this negotiation opportunity can be 
manipulated and may not effectively rectify the transparency problems discussed 
above. As explained in part 5, the Committee is dominated by member institutions 
(from the US and Europe) who have the human and financial capital to convince a 
disagreeing member to agree or at least not to disagree. The Committee has also 
undermined transparency by excluding a significant number of States from its decision 
making process; this has a serious implication for the excluded constituencies’ access to 
information. Needless to say, participation in decision making is an important 
mechanism to access information and better understand a regulatory process.  
Realizing the second important element of accountability – review – in an 
inherently informal regulatory system is also quite challenging. The regulatory system 
under Basel III has not yet developed formal review mechanisms which can fill the 
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accountability deficit in the system. While the global banking regulatory network has 
emerged as a global administrative body, its informality has effectively prevented the 
establishment of formal review mechanisms. Neither the Basel Committee reporting 
process which was  introduced in 2012 nor the joint assessments administered by the 
IMF and WB have developed into formal review mechanisms. No State or institution can 
be subjected to these review mechanisms and the whole process is voluntary. Nor can 
these informal assessments  be used to hold the global banking regulatory network 
accountable. They are rather meant to facilitate compliance with Basel standards 
through evaluation of the conduct of the banking sector worldwide.  
While the global banking regulatory system  reviews , at least informally, the 
banking sector’s compliance with its standards through the reporting and assessment 
processes, it has not established formal review mechanisms which can make it 
accountable to those affected by its decisions. Though assessment procedures like 
evaluation and compliance monitoring have become important horizontal 
accountability mechanisms in global administration, they are not yet institutionalized in 
the Basel III regulatory system. As accountability mechanisms, these assessment 
procedures do not only review the activities of a regulatory system; they impose 
sanctions as well. Such formal review mechanisms could not be easily realized in a 
regulatory system which is not constitutionalized. There is also no formal hierarchy 
among the groups forming the Basel III regulatory network. The formal hierarchy in 
international organizations, like the WTO, for example, enables the units higher in the 
hierarchy to review and, if needed, change the decisions of the lower units. Those units 
that are higher in the hierarchy are more participatory, and thus the internal review 
process ensures more inclusive and accountable governance. 
4.3 Participation in the regulatory process 
The global banking regulatory system has reshuffled itself, following the global financial 
crisis, to embrace more members. The Basel Committee has expanded its membership 
to 28 jurisdictions as discussed in part 5. This has turned countries like China which had 
been “rule-takers” in Basel I and II to rule-makers in the Basel III regulatory system.103 
As Chao Xi has stated, “China has been actively involving itself in the formulation, 
development and implementation of Basel III”.104 The inclusion of emerging markets as 
members of the Basel Committee is, therefore, seen as a positive move to enable such 
markets to participate in the regulatory process starting from the rule formulation 
process.105 
 
103 Xi C “From rule-taker to rule-maker: China’s changing roles in banking regulation’ in Weiss F & 
Kammel A (eds) The changing landscape of global financial governance and the role of soft law (Brill 2015) 
at 12-14. 
104 Xi (2015) at 13. 
105 Chey H Changing global financial governance international financial standards and emerging economies 
since the global financial crisis  (The Centre for International Governance Innovation, new thinking and 
the new G20, paper no 1 February 2015) at 1. 
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However, most of the emerging markets and a number of developed ones are not 
yet participants in the regulatory system’s decision making process while they are 
subjected to the norms developed by this regulatory system.106As LiYamin and Wang 
Hao have put it, “reform of international financial architecture remains limited, and it 
retains market-oriented characteristics and adjustment mechanisms”.107 Such a  
market-oriented membership expansion approach has denied a significant portion of 
the world’s population a decision making role in global financial governance. 
Membership expansion in this regulatory system does not, therefore, aim to build 
legitimacy through participatory governance. The G20, which is the executive 
coordinator of global banking regulation, is seriously criticized for proclaiming itself as 
“a leading international economic policymaking body without any formal legal mandate 
or consent by non-G20 member countries who are subjected to its norms and 
standards”.108 
The G20 justifies itself by claiming that its members constitute “around 90 
percent of global gross national product, 80 percent of world trade as well as two-thirds 
of the world’s population”.109 However, this claim is contrary to the generally accepted 
principles governing the global economic order. The UN General Assembly has 
consistently proclaimed the importance of participatory governance and equity in the 
global economic order.110 General Assembly Resolution 6/3201  has declared “broadest 
cooperation based on equity” and “full and effective participation on the basis of 
equality” as governing principles of global economic regulation.111 General Assembly 
Resolution 63/189 has also affirmed the importance of “the right to international 
economic order based on equal participation in the decision-making process” to build a 
just global order.112 
In terms of non-State stakeholder involvement in the decision making process of 
global governance, the global banking regulatory system could be considered as 
somehow embracive. The governors of the central banks of participating States are at 
the centre of the regulatory process. This would make the banking sector an active 
participant in decision making on global banking regulation. Banking professionals 
have, therefore, direct access to the regulatory process and they are developing 
standards under the auspice of the Basel Committee. Though the ultimate backers of the 
process of standard setting in global financial governance are the States, the financial 
sector, which has better expertise, is exercising substantial power.      
 
106 Alexander KRethinking stakeholder participation in global governance. Conference paper Global 
Financial Governance ( Geneva 26-27 February 2015) at 15. 
107 Yamin L &  Hao W “China and emerging economies in global financial governance: legitimacy, 
accountability and democracy” (2016) 21  J Shanghai Jiaotong Univ (Sci) 21 (2016) at 199-203. 
108 Alexander et al (2014) at 2-5. 
109 Alexander et al (2014) at 13. 
110 Alexander (2015) at 12. 
111 UN General Assembly Resolution 6/3201: Declaration on the establishment of a new international 
economic order (UN General Assembly, A/RES/S-6/3201, 1974) at ss 4-6. 
112 UN General Assembly Resolution 63/189: Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order 
(UN General Assembly, A/63/430/Add.2, 2008) at s 4. 
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As Ross Buckley and Douglas Arner have explained , “international standard-
setting” in global financial regulation is “largely of a technocratic nature”.113 Basel III 
standards are, therefore, developed by the banking sector itself which is governed by 
such standards. While the participation of the banking sector is appreciable given the 
growing importance of non-State actors in global governance, the exclusion of 
developing markets and the domination of the Basel Committee by financial institutions 
from the developed markets have made the process unduly technocratic, and denied 
consideration of the interests of developing markets.                
The global banking regulatory system, therefore, involves States as executive 
coordinators under the auspice of the G20, and non-State stakeholders as standard 
setters through the Basel Committee. It has, however, failed to adopt a participatory 
governance approach. As discussed above, the great majority of States is excluded from 
the forum which acts as the executive coordinator of global financial governance, and 
the Basel Committee membership expansion is market oriented and selective. This does 
not rhyme with the growing interdependence and globalization of financial markets. As 
Daniel Bradlow has stated , the global financial governance reforms made following the 
global financial crisis “have not kept up with the pressure created by the rapidly 
growing role of the emerging economies in the international financial and economic 
systems”.114 A participatory governance approach is, therefore, essential in global 
banking regulation and there should be a shift from market oriented to rule based 
membership expansion in the relevant regulatory forums including the G20 and Basel 
Committee.        
5. CONCLUSION                       
The interdependence problems in the global financial market became the subject of 
global governance owing to their ever-growing universal impact following the removal 
of restrictions on financial flows. While these problems  evolved into global governance 
issues over half a century ago, the global financial governance system is not yet 
constitutionalized. This governance system introduced Basel III in response to the 2008 
global financial crisis refining its previously developed standards. The Basel III 
regulatory process is led by an informal regulatory network. Thus, informality is one of 
the salient features of this regulatory process. Such a regulatory process poses 
challenges to the rule of law as there are no established limits on the powers exercised 
by the regulatory network. This article has addressed the consistency of the Basel III 
regulatory process with the rule of law by appraising this regulatory process in the light 
of the principles of accountability and participation. This part accentuates the main 
 
113Buckley R & Arner D From crisis to crisis: the global financial system and regulatory failure (Kluwer Law 
International 2011) At 77. 
114 Bradlow D “Rethinking global financial governance reform” *The World Financial Review ( 4 January 
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findings of this study about the consistency of the Basel III regulatory process with the 
rule of law. It then presents the policy implications of these findings. Finally, it presents 
the limitations of the study and the need for further investigation of the subject.    
Though Basel III is not a legally binding framework and was meant to be 
achieved through cooperation, the regulatory process under this framework has 
demonstrated features of coordination which require a lot more than voluntary 
collective actions. The Basel Committee has eventually become the global supervisory 
body over global banking following the global financial crisis. This Committee is backed 
by powerful informal groups like the G20, and international organizations including the 
IMF and WB. The IMF and WB conditionalities have become important Basel III 
implementation mechanisms. Such a network of politically and financially influential 
groups has, therefore, facilitated worldwide application of Basel III. Thus, the Basel III 
regulatory process has evolved into a global administrative system. 
While the Basel III regulatory system has emerged as a global administrative 
system, it has not yet embraced the relevant ideals of the rule of law which are 
necessary to build its legitimacy. The analysis of the Basel III regulatory process in the 
light of the principles of accountability and participation showed that it lacks the 
institutional and operational qualities necessary to ensure the rule of law. The 
informality inherent in the regulatory system has inhibited the advancement of the 
principles of accountability and participation in the system. 
Constitutional accountability is undermined in the Basel regulatory system as it 
has not yet developed a formal constitution which defines its functions, structure and 
objectives.115 Though the Basel Charter has incorporated principles on the structure and 
functions of the Committee, it does not impose legally binding obligations and lacks 
established horizontal accountability mechanisms which can ensure enforcement of 
constitutional accountability. Horizontal accountability mechanisms - transparency and 
review – are undermined by the informality inherent in the Basel III regulatory system. 
Though there are some improvements introduced through the Charter of the Basel 
Committee, lack of clarity, decision making by invisible groups through publicly 
unknown procedures, and informal implementation process have undermined 
transparency. Evaluation and compliance monitoring are also not institutionalized in 
the regulatory system. Therefore, this regulatory system does not provide a formal 
guarantee for adherence to the principle of accountability through  transparent decision 
making and a review process.    
These accountability mechanisms are also largely ignored in practice. The G20 
and the Basel Committee which are at the hub of the Basel III regulatory system 
undermine transparency as they hold their meetings behind closed doors, details of 
their deliberations are mostly confidential, and membership is not based on defined 
criteria. Though the Basel Committee has made some progress while developing Basel 
III by opening up its proposals for public comment, its decision making process has 
remained non-transparent. Basel III was developed through an informal law making 
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process which does not guarantee transparent norm formulation. Lack of formal 
enforcement mechanisms has also undermined transparency by inviting influential 
groups within the regulatory network, like the G20 and IMF, to use their political and 
financial powers to ensure compliance. 
The Basel III regulatory process has also been in contradiction of the second 
relevant element of the rule of law – participation.116 Though some reforms have been 
made following the global financial crisis to embrace more members, they were market 
oriented. Such a membership expansion approach coupled with the lack of membership 
criteria have made participation in the regulatory process very selective. This in turn 
has excluded a significant portion of the world’s population from decision making in 
global banking regulation. Member jurisdictions themselves are also not equally 
represented in the Basel Committee decision making process as this Committee is 
dominated by member institutions from over-represented jurisdictions, namely,  the US 
and Europe.           
The Basel III regulatory process has, therefore, undermined the rule of law as it 
is inconsistent with the principles of accountability and participation which are the core 
elements of the rule of law. The rule of law limits public power principally by making a 
regulatory system accountable and participatory. The accountability deficit and lack of 
inclusive governance in the Basel III regulatory system have inhibited the advancement 
of the rule of law which should have been fostered to build legitimacy in this regulatory 
system.   
The elements of the rule of law discussed in  this study – accountability and 
participation – have become important instruments in building legitimacy in global 
regulatory systems. A regulatory system that ignores such elements of the rule of law 
can hardly be defended. Though the interdependence problems of global finance are 
intricate and thus require innovative ways of governance, relying on an non-
constitutionalized and inherently informal regulatory system leads to uncertainties. 
Exercising public power through this informal regulatory network which is not subject 
to the rule of law would enable those who have controlled the regulatory network to 
pursue their interest through unconstrained power. The non-participants do not have 
the opportunity to collectively control this regulatory system while they are subjected 
to its standards. This does not accord with the growing interdependence among 
financial markets across the globe. Such form of governance also does not  recognize the 
growing importance of accountability and participation in global administration. Hence, 
it sets a bad precedent for the role of the rule of law in global governance.                                   
The Basel III regulatory process should, therefore, embrace the rule of law to 
ensure that the exercise of public power in global banking regulation is subject to 
control. Efficiency alone cannot justify this regulatory system as legitimate existence 
based on output requires, as a threshold, generally accepted principles which can 
guarantee that power will not be misused. As the Basel III regulatory system has 
evolved into a global administrative system, it should adopt and adhere to the principles 
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of accountability and participation to build its legitimacy. This would, of course, require 
institutionalisation of the system as it is the informality inherent therein  which has 
undermined the rule of law.          
Lastly, it should be noted that the subject of this article requires further and 
more comprehensive investigation. The article has examined the Basel III regulatory 
process in the light of only two elements of the rule of law using a methodology which 
has not involved integrated interdisciplinary research due to the limited human 
resources, time and space. Further investigation of this subject using more, if not all, of 
the elements of the rule of law through an integrated interdisciplinary research can 
produce better results. Moreover, the findings of this study invite an important question 
which has to be answered through further research : how should the Basel III regulatory 
system be subjected to the rule of law ? Therefore, the methodological limitations and 
the findings of this study suggest further investigation of the subject to fill the gaps  and 
address further aspects of the topic.  
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